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Abstract
We investigate whether joining the European Monetary Union and losing the ability
to set monetary policy affected the economic growth of Eurozone countries. We use the
synthetic control approach to create a counterfactual scenario for how each Eurozone
country would have evolved without adopting the Euro. We let this matching algo-
rithm determine which combination of other developed economies best resembles the
pre-Euro path of twelve Eurozone economies. Our estimates suggest that there were
some mild losers (France, Germany, Italy, and Portugal) and a clear winner (Ireland).
Nevertheless, a gross domestic product decomposition suggests that the drivers of the
economic gains and losses are heterogeneous. In particular, our results show that for
the majority of Eurozone countries, Euro spurred government consumption and de-
terred investment and private consumption. The common currency also stimulated
trade for most cases but only Germany and Ireland bear positive net trade benefits.
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“For all the seven long years since the signing of the Maastricht treaty started Europe
on the road to that unified currency, critics have warned that the plan was an invitation to
disaster.” (Krugman, 1998)
1 Introduction
In January 1999, the exchange rates between member countries’ national currencies and
the euro were fixed irrevocably and the European Central Bank (ECB) officially took over
the responsibility of conducting the unified monetary policy. Twenty years have passed since
the Euro was launched and the member states gave up the ability to set their own monetary
policy. In this work, we evaluate whether joining the Euro had any macroeconomic effect
for twelve of the Eurozone countries.
To address this question, we develop a counterfactual scenario that represents how each
Eurozone country would have evolved without adopting the Euro as their currency. For
this analysis, we employ what is arguably the most important innovation in the policy
evaluation literature in the last fifteen years - the synthetic control method (SCF) (Athey
and Imbens (2017)). We let this matching algorithm determine which combination of other
OECD advanced economies best resembles the pre-Euro path of each Eurozone member. We
then compare the post-Euro macroeconomic performance of each economy to its synthetic
doppelganger. In particular, by decomposing the countries’ and the doppelgangers’ gross
domestic product (GDP) into their components, we identify the main drivers of the accession
gains and losses.
In the context of the Eurozone, it was expected that adopting a common currency
would reduce the exchange rate volatility, the transaction costs, and any price discrimi-
nation (De Grauwe (2020)). Most likely, it could spur trade and investment within the Euro
area (Frankel and Rose (1998)). Notwithstanding, since its announcement, many have been
calling into question the success of the Euro (Wyplosz (2006)). They believed that the Eu-
rozone did not satisfy the requirements of an Optimum Currency Area, especially due to the
lack of labor mobility (Jonung, Drea, et al. (2009)). Additionally, the Euro area countries
could no longer set monetary policy independently thus becoming more exposed to external
(asymmetric) shocks. Nowadays, the rising strength of nationalism movements in Europe
has intensified doubts about the advantages of the Eurozone (Fligstein et al. (2012), Guiso et
al. (2019)). Some of the arguments put forward are the loss of sovereignty and the suitability
of the “one-size-fits-all” monetary policy. Moreover, the recent developments of the Covid-19
pandemic in Europe have highlighted the lack of solidarity, ability and, in some cases, the
willingness of the Eurozone to take action during such fragile and crucial moments.
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Our contribution is two-folded. First, we evaluate the macroeconomic impact of adopting
the Euro measured by the real gross domestic product (GDP). Theoretical predictions about
this effect are ambiguous and depend on whether the costs outweigh the benefits of joining
the Eurozone.1 Indeed, we find that there are some mild losers (France, Germany, Italy,
and Portugal) and a clear winner (Ireland). Such heterogeneous findings are in line with
De Grauwe (2020) and Puzzello and Gomis-Porqueras (2018).
Next, we investigate which were the channels driving the output gains and losses and if
they differed from country to country. For Ireland, the private consumption and investment
notably explain almost 80% of the total output gain from joining the Euro. While for
France and Portugal, the private consumption and the net exports accounted for a large
share of the economic loss, in the case of Germany and Italy, the private consumption and
the investment explain the negative impact of the Euro. For most countries, the trade volume
was significantly higher than if they had not joined the Eurozone. Nonetheless, the common
currency had a positive impact on the trade balance solely for Germany and Ireland.
This paper is related to several strands of the literature. The first one is directly related
to the methodology used to construct the counterfactuals. To employ the Synthetic Control
Method (SCM), we follow the original work by Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003), Abadie et
al. (2010) and (2015) who developed the methodology.2 Furthermore, we follow more recent
work by Campos et al. (2018) who evaluate the impact of the European Union accession,
Born et al. (2019) who assess the macroeconomic impact of the election of Donald Trump as
the President of the USA, and finally Breinlich et al. (2020) and Born et al. (2020) who study
the costs of economic nationalism by looking at the Brexit vote impact on the transactions
and GDP, respectively.
This paper also contributes to the literature that studies the macroeconomic impact
of joining a currency union. Starting from the groundbreaking contribution of Mundell
(1961) on the theory of optimal currency areas, many economists have been studying the
key characteristics that allow a group of countries to benefit from having the same currency.
McKinnon (1963) and Kenen (1969) have added seminal contributions to this theory by
exploring the role of international trade and diversified output structures in determining the
costs and benefits of joining a monetary union.
More recent work from Alesina and Barro (2002) explains that forgoing monetary policy,
on the one hand, implies losing a stabilization device to deal with domestic shocks but, on
the other hand, can boost credibility and price stability. Alesina and Barro (2002) show
1We refer the reader to Lane (2006) and Beetsma and Giuliodori (2010) who provide a more recent account
of the real effects of the European Monetary Union by surveying the literature on its macroeconomic costs
and benefits.
2A good overview of the literature using this methodology can be found in Abadie (2019).
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that if there is a reduction in trading costs, the adoption of a common currency has a direct
positive effect on trade, output, and consumption.3
There is also a broad literature that tests empirically these theoretical links. At about
the time the euro was launched, Rose (2000) famously estimated that a currency union could
boost up to three times bilateral trade. The relevance of these results to the euro case was
immediately doubted since the sample used for the analysis was based on unions of small,
poor, and remote countries. Micco et al. (2003) developed the first comprehensive study for
the impact of the European Monetary Union (EMU) on trade, concluding that the Euro had
a positive impact not only on trade between member states but also with third parties.
Some papers have also highlighted the impact of currency unions on investment. Among
others, Barr, Breedon, and Miles (2003) suggest that inward investment in the countries out-
side the union would have been greater if they had joined the EMU. Furthermore, De Sousa
and Lochard (2011) estimate that, in the Eurozone countries, investment increased with the
single currency adoption.
In particular, this paper closely relates to the recent literature about the Euro adoption
using the synthetic control approach (Ferna´ndez and Garcia-Perea (2015), Verstegen et al.
(2017), and Gasparotti and Kullas (2019) among others). We build directly on the work
of Puzzello and Gomis-Porqueras (2018) by extending their analysis from six to the twelve
member states which joined the Euro before 2007. Furthermore, we use a GDP decomposi-
tion to investigate the channels that drove the economic gains and losses of the accession.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the construction
of the doppelganger, its implementation, and the data used. Section 3 presents the results
and performs robustness exercises. Section 4 explores the potential channels through which
the Euro adoption affected the GDP. We briefly conclude in Section 5.
3Alesina, Barro, and Tenreyro (2002) and Barro and Tenreyro (2007) empirically investigate and present
evidence in accordance with these theoretical predictions.
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2 Constructing the doppelganger
2.1 The synthetic control method
To measure the impact of the EMU accession on the macroeconomic performance of
the Eurozone countries, we construct a doppelganger for each Eurozone country based on
the synthetic control methodology (SCM) developed by Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003),
Abadie et al. (2010) and (2015).4 Ideally, these doppelgangers behave just like the Eurozone
economies except for the Euro adoption.
The goal is to compute the treatment effect of a policy intervention:
τi,t ≡ Y
I
i,t − Y
C
i,t
where Y Ii,t represents the realized outcome of country i in period t and Y
C
i,t stands for the
non-observable outcome of country i in period t absent from the policy intervention. Abadie
and Gardeazabal (2003) proposed the SCM to estimate Y Ci,t by constructing a doppelganger
as a weighted average of the outcomes of non-treated units. We refer to these units as “donor
countries” and to the set of these countries as “donor pool” throughout the paper. Suppose
that we have N + 1 countries and country i = 1 is exposed to the intervention of interest.
Then, an unbiased estimate of the treatment effect, which we refer to as doppelganger gap
throughout this paper, is defined as:
τˆ1,t = Y
I
1,t −
N+1∑
i=2
wiYi,t (1)
where wi is the estimated weight assigned to donor country i to construct the doppel-
ganger.
The weights are chosen to minimize the difference between each treated unit and its
doppelganger’s pre-intervention outcome variable and predictors. The outcome variable
studied is real GDP and the set of predictors used is based on Abadie and Gardeazabal
(2003) and Born et al. (2019). These predictors are the average GDP shares of private
consumption, government consumption, investment, exports, imports, the employed share
of the population, the labor productivity growth, the real GDP and its lags.5
Formally, let x1 denote the (37× 1) vector of 30 observations for real GDP and 7 covari-
ates’ averages in each Eurozone country and X0 denote a (37×14) matrix with observations
from the donor countries. Finally, w denotes a (14 × 1) vector of weights wi, i = 2, ..., 15.
4A detailed exposition of the method can be found in Abadie (2019).
5We avoid the so-called cherry-picking problem in Ferman et al. (2020) by choosing a standard set of
predictors based on previous empirical literature.
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Then, the optimal weighting scheme is defined by w∗ which minimizes the following mean
squared error:
(x1 −X0w)
′V(x1 −X0w) (2)
subject to:
wi ≥ 0 for i = 2, ..., 15 (3)
15∑
i=2
wi = 1 (4)
where V is a (14 × 14) symmetric and positive semidefinite weighting matrix assigning
different relevance to the characteristics in x1 and X0. Following Abadie and Gardeaza-
bal (2003) and Abadie et al. (2010), we choose a diagonal V matrix such that the mean
squared prediction error of the outcome variable (and the covariates) is minimized for the
pre-treatment period.6
2.1.1 Implementation
The SCM offers several advantages to study the question at hand. This method is
transparent regarding the construction of the counterfactual and the fit of the control unit
to the treated unit. It provides the exact weight of each donor country for the construction of
the doppelganger. The fit of the counterfactual can be inspected by comparing the outcome
variable and other characteristics of the treated unit with the estimated data. It is also
important to highlight that this method allows the design decisions, like the choice of donor
pool and predictors, to be made regardless of post-treatment considerations and without
knowing the implication for the results. Moreover, the SCM precludes extrapolation since
the estimated weights are non-negative and sum to one.7
To successfully implement the SCM several contextual and data requirements should be
satisfied.8 Especially for estimating causal effects, the credibility of the results severely de-
pends on whether these requirements are met in the empirical application at hand. Therefore,
we now present these requirements and how we address them.
First, treated units and the donor countries should be comparable. The counterfactual
6Including the covariates in the optimization differs from Kaul et al. (2018) who have raised concerns
about including all pre-intervention outcomes together with covariates when using the SCM. The covariates
used are relevant for the computation of the doppelgangers and its choice hinged on theoretical grounds.
7See King and Zeng (2006) for more information about the dangers of relying on extrapolation to estimate
counterfactuals
8See Abadie (2019) for more detail on these requirements.
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should be identical to the treated unit in all dimensions except for the treatment assignment.
When the treated unit is a country, an “ideal” control unit rarely exists in observed data
because countries differ widely across demographic, legislative and economic characteristics
(Born et al., 2020). Yet, the donor pool selection should try to accommodate this need.
Unlike Puzzello and Gomis-Porqueras (2018) and Gasparotti and Kullas (2019), we ensure
that the donor countries can resemble the level of economic and social development of the
treated units by using only OECD economies in our estimates. It is important to restrict
the donor pool to units with outcomes that are expected to be driven by the same structural
processes as the treated unit (Abadie et al., 2015). When using developing countries with
structurally higher growth rates to create a doppelganger for an advanced economy with
structurally more modest growth rates, results are condemned to be biased. Using a smaller
donor pool that guarantees more similarities with the treated unit should be preferred, albeit
the expected poorer fit (Abadie & Gardeazabal, 2003).
Secondly, since the counterfactual weights are constructed according to the pre-intervention
characteristics, we have to assure that there are no (external) differentiated shocks during
the study period in the donor pool countries (Abadie (2019)). To account for this issue, con-
trarily to Ferna´ndez and Garcia-Perea (2015) and Verstegen et al. (2017), we only consider
observations until 2007. From 2008 onward, the Great Recession affected countries in very
different ways and arguably provoked structural changes in the affected economies.
It is also important to exclude any country that was treated from the donor pool. In this
context, this is addressed by using only donor countries that never adopted the Euro.
Furthermore, policy interventions frequently have spillover effects to non-treated units.
When employing the SCM, it is important to ensure that the counterfactuals are not affected
by the treatment. In our analysis, this is equivalent to ruling out the possibility that the Euro
adoption by an individual country affected the outcome variable of the donor countries. This
assumption is tested by performing in-space placebo testes in section 3.2.2.
Fourth, the intervention has no effect on the outcome before the implementation period.
In section 3.2.1, potential anticipation effects are tested by changing the treatment date used
in the analysis.
The SCM requires as well a sizable number of pre- and post-intervention periods. In the
literature, previous SCM applications with yearly data use between 20 (Abadie & Gardeaz-
abal, 2003) and 30 pre-treatment periods (Abadie et al., 2015). The reason is that the credi-
bility of a synthetic control depends upon how well it tracks the treated unit’s characteristics
and outcomes over an extended period of time prior to the treatment. The post-treatment
period should be long enough to account for delayed or dissipated effects of the intervention.
These requirements are satisfied with the data used in the analysis as discussed next in
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section .
Finally, it is important to guarantee that there are no extreme values in the variable of
interest for the treated units. The SCM is based on the idea that a combination of unaffected
units can approximate the pre-intervention characteristics of the affected unit. However, if
the treated unit exhibits “extreme” values for the outcome variable this is not possible. We
address this issue by normalizing real GDP to unity in 1970.
2.2 Data and Sample
We use annual data from 1970 until 2007 from the Penn World Tables, version 9.1 (PWT
9.1 - Feenstra, Inklaar, and Timmer (2015)) and the World Bank. We focus on the real
GDP as our main outcome variable and conduct our analysis on twelve Eurozone countries,
namely Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg,
the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain.9
We assume the treatment date takes place in 1999 for all countries except for Greece,
which joined the Eurozone later in 2001. In our baseline estimate, we have at least 29
pre-intervention periods, from 1970 to 1998, which is sufficiently large to apply the SCM.
Doppelgangers are constructed on the basis of a donor pool of 14 countries selected as
follows. First, only OECD countries are used to ensure that doppelgangers are sufficiently
similar to the treated countries. Then, all countries that joined the European Union or the
Eurozone during the post-treatment period are excluded. This guarantees that the donor
countries are neither affected by the treatment nor suffer a differentiated external shock
during the post-treatment period.
For our baseline estimates, we do not restrict the donor pool further except for countries
for which the necessary data is not available. The pool is composed of Australia, Canada,
Chile, Denmark, Iceland, Israel, Korea, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland,
the United Kingdom, and the United States.
We believe this donor pool is just narrow enough to guarantee that these donor countries
are comparable to the treated units but do not compromise the application of the SCM and
estimation of the counterfactuals. Possible flukes to this belief are assessed in section 3.3.1
where we perform robustness checks by excluding individual and groups of countries from
the donor pool.
9The outcome variable is normalized to unity in 1970 in each country. Consult Table A.1 for further
details on the data. Focusing on the normalized per capita real GDP instead does not change the results.
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3 Empirical Results
This section starts by presenting the baseline results for the impact of the Euro acces-
sion. Next, taking into account the assumptions addressed in Section 2.1.1, we discuss the
statistical significance and causality of these results by performing two types of placebo ex-
ercises. First, we apply in-space placebo tests in Section 3.2.2 which assign the treatment to
all countries in the donor pool. Then, in Section 3.2.1, we perform in-time placebo tests in
which placebo treatment dates are assigned to the treated countries.
The main findings in this section corroborate the results of Puzzello and Gomis-Porqueras
(2018) and add new insights by concluding that the results for France, Germany, Ireland,
Italy, and Portugal are statistically significant.
3.1 Baseline results: Assessing Euro’s macroeconomic impact
It is expected that the SCM yields an imperfect pre-treatment match for some countries
given that our procedure determines 14 parameters (country weights) to match 37 observa-
tions. Notwithstanding, this methodology can provide substantial improvement relative to
alternative methods as differences-in-differences (Ferman and Pinto (2019)) and thus, we are
confident that this data-driven approach is the best to study the problem at hands.
Table A.3 displays the donor country weights that constitute each doppelganger. For
instance, the synthetic Spain is composed by all countries in the donor pool yet being signif-
icantly constructed by using data from the United States (46%), Mexico (19%), Switzerland
(18%), and Australia (16%). We are overall confident on the plausibility and credibility of
the methodology weighting scheme.10
Table A.2 shows that doppelgangers are very similar to the actual countries when com-
paring their predictors means despite using the same specification for all countries.11 Fur-
thermore, in Appendix A.7, we show that the doppelgangers are successful in recovering the
time path of all GDP components for most of the analyzed countries.
Figure 1 displays the real GDP for each country (full black line) and doppelganger (dashed
blue line) presented as the deviation from the first year of the sample in percent. The shaded
area represents two standard deviations of the pre-treatment difference between the actual
and the counterfactual series. When the doppelganger series deviates from the realized path
in such a way that exceeds these bounds, it indicates that such deviation is non-standard
compared to the pre-Euro period.
10Potential concerns regarding the use of countries which belong to the Exchange Rate Mechanism (Den-
mark, Sweden, and the United Kingdom) are addressed in Section 3.3.1.
11Matching only the key variable might suffice but having further similarities in related variables is also
important and ensures the robustness of the findings (Botosaru and Ferman (2019)).
8
Figure 1: The impact of the Eurozone accession
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Notes: In each graph, the dashed line represents the normalized real GDP for the synthetic country
and the continuous line represents the series for the actual country. The shaded area corresponds to
two standard deviations of the difference between the treated country and the doppelganger prior
to the Euro accession. The vertical line represents the treatment period - 1999 for all countries
except for Greece which is 2001. For each country, the analysis starts in 1970 and ends in 2007.
A number of observations stand out. The pre-treatment paths for most countries and
their doppelgangers are overlapping. Moreover, Figure 1 shows some series embarking on
a different growth trajectory relative to their counterfactuals only around the Eurozone
creation.
Table 1 presents the exact doppelganger gaps measured in Euro per capita. Ireland
benefited the most from the Euro adoption. Its GDP per capita was 10,781 Euro higher due
to the common currency adoption. However, France, Germany, Italy, and Portugal would
be better off by not participating in this currency union. Yet, Germany and Italy lost the
most: 5,788 and 6,089 Euro per capita respectively.
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Table 1: Doppelganger Output Gap
AUT BEL FIN FRA DEU GRC IRL ITA LUX NLD PRT ESP
Gap
-1,712 -1,668 777 -2,632 -5,788 -1,098 10,781 -6,089 4,697 168 -2,558 900
(Euros per capita)
Notes: This table presents the doppelganger output gap per capita in 2007. This measure is
obtained by adjusting the real GDP gap for the population size and converting 2011 US dollars
into 2011 Euro. We use the conversion rate available from the PWT 9.1 for this year (≈ 0.73).
3.2 Causality
A key assumption to study the impact of a policy intervention is that there is no reverse
causality. In our context, this means that countries must not have adopted the Euro due to
economic considerations. This assumption is plausible because the Eurozone accession was
driven mainly by political rather than economic factors (Eichengreen and Frieden (1993),
Feldstein (1997)). In fact, by not satisfying the requirements of an Optimum Currency
Area, many economists believed that countries adopting the Euro would face economic losses
(Jonung et al., 2009). This argument holds even for the Greek case which had decided to
join the Euro before the single currency was a reality.12
Sections 2.1.1 and 2.2 discussed the conditions under which the SCM provides suitable
estimates of causal effects and this section addresses some of these requirements. To further
back the notion that the doppelganger gap is indeed caused by the Euro adoption, Sections
3.2.1 and 3.2.2 provides a number of placebo experiments and robustness checks. We can be
confident that the synthetic control estimator captures the causal effect of an intervention
as long as similar magnitudes are not estimated in cases where the intervention did not take
place (Born et al., 2020). Finally, Section discusses the statistical significance of the results
3.2.3.
3.2.1 In-time placebo test: anticipation effects
On 7 February 1992, representatives from twelve countries signed the Maastricht Treaty
– Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands,
Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom. Upon signing it, it was common knowledge that
a monetary union, with a central banking system and a common currency, was to be created
within the next years. It is, therefore, reasonable to think that countries experienced, at
least partly, the Eurozone accession’s impact before the Euro was launched.
12According to the 1998 convergence report from the European Commission, Greece did not join the
single currency in 1999 because it had not fulfilled any of the four convergence criteria. Notwithstanding,
the decision of joining was already made.
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To check for anticipation effects of the Euro adoption, we perform in-time placebo tests by
inspecting different intervention periods in our analysis. The date the Maastricht Treaty was
signed is taken as the placebo treatment period. Figure 2 suggests that the main conclusions
from Figure 1 remain unchanged.
We ran further time-placebo tests in which the placebo treatment date is set artificially
to be every year from 1992 until 1998. For the sake of brevity, besides the Maastricht Treaty
date 1992, we only report the tests for 1995 and 1998 in Figures A.1 and A.2. Reassuringly,
the results remain unaltered.13
Figure 2: In-time placebo tests
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Notes: In each graph, the blue dashed line represents the normalized real GDP for the synthetic
country and the black full line represents the series for the actual country. The shaded area
corresponds to two standard deviations of the difference between the treated country and the
doppelganger prior to the Euro accession. The vertical line depicts the placebo treatment period -
1992 for all countries. For all countries, the analysis starts in 1970 and ends in 2007.
Figure 2 presents limited evidence in favor of the existence of anticipation effects. If
13The remaining figures can be provided by the authors upon request.
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anything, the gap between the actual and the synthetic series becomes wider than the one
analyzed in Figure 1. Notwithstanding, the direction of the effect remains unchanged. Thus,
ignoring possible anticipation effects in our baseline estimates may lead to a lower bound of
the Euro impact for countries like Austria, Belgium, France, and Italy.14
The absence of anticipation effects for the remaining countries may be due to two things.
First, the key event representing a change for most European citizens was the irrevocably
the exchange rate fix on 31st December 1998 and the Euro launch on the 1st of January
1999. Second, most of these countries had already experienced trade and economic gains
from joining the European Union (Campos et al., 2018). Therefore, such effects lie in our
pre-treatment sample and thus, are already being considered.
3.2.2 In-space placebo test
Following Abadie et al. (2010), Abadie and Cattaneo (2018), and Firpo and Possebom
(2018), we employ the synthetic control methodology on the donor pool countries while
exposing them to a placebo treatment in 1999. The idea is to sequentially “re-assign”
the treatment to all units in the donor pool and, for each of them, estimate a fictitious
doppelganger using the remaining donor countries and the originally treated unit. We repeat
this process for every treated country.
Next, we compare the post and pre-treatment behavior of these series and inspect the
differences between treated and fictionally treated units. If our benchmark estimates for
each Eurozone country are picking up the causal effect of the Euro accession, these should
dominate any possible impact of the fictitious event in the donor countries. On the other
hand, if no difference is found, then most likely the actual intervention had no effect. Ap-
plying this idea to each country in the donor pool allows us to compare the estimated effect
of the Euro accession on Eurozone countries to the distribution of placebo effects obtained
for the other countries (Abadie et al., 2015).
The plots from Figure 3 depict the doppelganger gaps for treated countries (black lines)
and donor countries (grey lines), that is, the differences between each countries’ normalized
GDP and their doppelgangers’ estimates. The smaller the gap for the pre-treatment period,
the better the fit of the synthetic series to the outcome variable. Countries with a bad pre-
intervention fit are excluded from the in-space placebo test because they are not suited to
inform about the post-treatment effect.15
14The case for Greece is not worrisome given its bad pre-treatment fit and, therefore, its lack of significance.
15We define a good pre-intervention fit following Firpo and Possebom (2018) when the pre-intervention
MSPE of a donor country is at most four times greater than the Eurozone country’s pre-intervention MSPE
being analyzed.
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Figure 3: In-space placebo tests
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Notes: The plotted lines represent the prediction error for the treated country (black) and donor countries
(grey) for which we impose a fictitious Euro accession. We plot the donor countries whose pre-treatment
MSPE was four times larger than the one of the treated country.
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Visually, Figure 3 reinforces the findings in Figure 1. When comparing the full black
lines from each Euro-adopter country to the grey lines of fictitious treated units, it is clear
that, for some countries, the post-treatment gap is unusually bigger. Specifically, it suggests
a positive impact of the Euro accession on Ireland and Luxembourg and a negative impact,
if any, on France, Germany, Italy, and Portugal.
3.2.3 Statistical Significance
To evaluate the statistical significance of our estimates and following Abadie et al. (2010)
and Abadie and Cattaneo (2018), we use a test based on the classic framework for permu-
tation inference which builds on the computations presented in the previous section.
Given our estimates of all fictional treatment effects in the previous section, we can
evaluate the statistical significance by computing a p-value associated with the treatment.
First, we compute the ratio of root mean squared prediction errors (RMSPE) in the post-
intervention period relative to the pre-intervention period for treated and fictitiously treated
units as follows:
χ ≡
RMSPEpost
RMSPEpre
≡
√
1
T−T0+1
T∑
t=T0
(x1,t − x0,tw)2√
1
T0−1
T0−1∑
t=1
(x1,t − x0,tw)2
(5)
where x1,t denotes the GDP of the treated country at period t; x0,t denotes a vector of
observations of GDP for the donor countries in period t; w denotes a vector of weights for
the donor countries, T denotes the total number of periods, and T0 denotes the treatment
date.
This statistic already allows a quantitative analysis of the treatment effect taking into
account the quality of the match produced by the SCM. A small pre-treatment RMSPE
implies a good fit of the synthetic series to the actual series and a large post-treatment
RMSPE suggests, for the treated units, a large intervention impact. Therefore, obtaining a
larger ratio for the treated unit than for the placebo-treated units would entail a significant
treatment effect.16
Figure 4 depicts this relative measure for the Eurozone countries (black diamonds) and
its donors (grey circles). Ireland clearly stands out as the country with the highest RMSPE
ratio with a post-intervention gap about 16 times larger than its pre-intervention gap.
16A large post-intervention RMSPE per se is not indicative of a large effect of the intervention. It depends
on whether the synthetic control can reproduce closely the outcome of interest prior to the intervention
(Abadie, 2019).
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Figure 4: Ratio between the post- and pre-treatment RMSPE
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Notes: The plots show the ratio between the post- and the pre-intervention RMSPE for the treated
units (in black diamonds) and all donor countries (in grey circles).
We deem the effect of the Euro adoption significant if the estimated effect for the treated
units is unusually large relative to the distribution of the placebo effects. To test this in
practice, we compute a p-value which compares the value of the RMSPE for the treated
country to that of all other units as follows:
ρ1 =
N+1∑
i=1
I(χi ≥ χ1) / (N + 1) (6)
where I(.) denotes the indicator function, N the number of donor countries, χ1 the
RMSPE ratio for the treated unit and χi is the RMSPE ratio for country i which can be a
donor or the treated country.
Table A.4 presents the RMSPE ratios, (χ), for all countries in the baseline analysis and
correspondent p-values for the treated units. If one were to pick a country at random from
the Irish sample, the chances of obtaining a ratio as high as the Irish would be 1/15 = 0.067
which we consider to be statistically significant. A closer look at Table A.4 and Figure 4
shows that Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Germany, and France experienced a significant impact
from adopting the Euro in terms of their real GDP.
3.3 Further robustness checks
3.3.1 Changes to donor pool
This section addresses two concerns. First, some countries in the control group may have
opted out of the treatment. This would suggest a reverse causality problem and raise doubts
15
about the credibility of the results presented. As discussed at the beginning of Section 3.2,
countries used in the analysis must not have opted in or out due to economic considerations.
In fact, the UK, Sweden, and Denmark belonged to the European Union at the time but
did not adopt the common currency. Even though they did opt out due to political reasons,
we still address this issue by excluding these countries altogether from the donor pool. We
redo our analysis with this new pool and the results are presented in Figure 5. The main
conclusions remain unchanged for all the Eurozone countries. With special attention for the
ones whose doppelgangers’ construction highly relied on this trio - Austria, Belgium, France,
Germany, Italy, and Portugal.
Figure 5: Impact of the Euro accession with a change in the donor pool
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Notes: In each graph, the blue dashed line represents the normalized real GDP for the synthetic
country and the black full line represents the series for the actual country. The shaded area
corresponds to two standard deviations of the difference between the treated country and the
doppelganger prior to the Euro accession. The vertical line depicts the treatment period - 2001 for
Greece and 1999 for the remaining countries. For all countries the analysis starts in 1970 and ends
in 2007. Relative to the baseline analysis, the donor pool now excludes Denmark, Sweden and the
United Kingdom. Table A.5 show the weights used to construct these results.
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Second, there might have been spillover effects of the treatment onto the donor countries.
We address this issue by iteratively re-estimating our baseline estimate for each Eurozone
country excluding in each iteration one of the countries with positive weight.
We display this robustness check for countries that weighted, at least, 10% in the con-
struction of, at least, 2 countries’ counterfactuals in Appendix A.6. This exercise shows that
no particular donor country is driving the main conclusions. So, it is unlikely that neither
spillover effects nor one specific country in the donor pool is driving the results.
3.3.2 Changes in the sample period
The credibility of the SCM results severely depends on whether the requirements specified
in Section 2.1.1 are satisfied. One of these requirements was that countries should not
experience differentiated shocks during the sample period. Several analysed countries joined
the European Union during the pre-treatment period may concern the most attentive reader.
For countries which joined the EU at least 10 years before the Eurozone creation, we
re-do the estimates using their accession data as the start of our sample, i.e. Ireland (1973),
Greece (1981), Portugal and Spain (1986). From Figure 6, it is possible to conclude that the
results from the baseline analysis are robust.
Unfortunately, it is not possible to re-estimate the results for Austria and Finland because
they joined the EU in 1995. Yet, according to Campos et al. (2018), Austria and Finland
were not significantly affected by the EU accession and thus we believe that this does not
pose a problem to our analysis.
4 What drives the doppelganger gap?
In this section, we take one step further and investigate what drives the results presented
in Figure 1 by decomposing the Euro accession response of GDP into the response of its
components. First, we compute the series for each GDP component for both countries and
corresponding counterfactuals. Then, we try to understand what explains the output gains
and losses from the accession by accounting the role of each component for the doppelganger
GDP gap.
This analysis begins by constructing the synthetic shares of GDP components using the
weights estimated in Section 2 and the data from the donor countries. Similarly to the
construction of the synthetic GDP series, we now compute the synthetic shares of each
GDP component as a weighted average of the shares of GDP components for the donor
countries. Namely, we obtain GDP shares of private consumption, investment, government
consumption, exports, and imports. Then, we use each component share and the GDP
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Figure 6: The impact of the Euro accession with a change in the sample period
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Notes: In each graph, the blue dashed line represents the normalized real GDP for the synthetic
country and the black full line represents the series for the actual country. The shaded area
corresponds to two standard deviations of the difference between the treated country and the
doppelganger prior to the Euro accession. The vertical line depicts the treatment period - 1999 for
Ireland, Greece, and Portugal and 2001 for Greece. The analysis starts in 1973 for Ireland, 1981
for Greece, and 1986 for Portugal and Spain. For all countries, the analysis ends in 2007.
series to compute the five GDP components series for both countries and doppelgangers. In
Appendix A.7, we present these series as a deviation from the 1970 value in percent.
It is important to highlight that comparing the actual and the synthetic series from
Appendix A.7 also indicates whether the doppelganger can really mimic the behaviour of
each country prior to the Euro accession. We must recall that the construction of the
doppelganger in Section 2 does not target the time path of GDP components and thus, a
good fit in this regard can not be taken for granted. Overall, the figures from Appendix A.7
reassure us of the good fit of the our estimates.
Next, we compute the contribution of each GDP component for the output gap generated
by the treatment. In section 2.1, Equation 1 defines the doppelganger gap as the difference
in the outcome variable (here, real GDP) between the treated and the synthetic country.
The cumulative treatment effect can be estimated by computing the doppelganger gap for
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t = 2007, the last year of our analysis.
Here, we proceed in four steps. Analogously to Equation 1, we start by computing
doppelganger gaps for each GDP component. Then, we compute the relative weight of each
component z on the output doppelganger gap in the following way:
weight of z c,t =
zc,t − z
dop
c,t
GDPc,t −GDP
dop
c,t
(7)
where z is either private consumption, government consumption, investment, exports, or
imports, the subscript c stands for one of the twelve treated countries, and the subscript t
represents the time period. Thereafter, we calculate the percent doppelganger gap for GDP
as follows:
percent output doppelganger gap c,t =
GDPc,t −GDP
dop
c,t
GDP dopc,t
(8)
Showing the treatment effect in percent terms allows a direct interpretation of how much
larger/smaller the GDP is due to the Euro accession. Finally, we multiply the relative weight
of each doppelganger gap zc,t by the percent output doppelganger gap. This allows us to
understand the direct contribution of each channel to the treatment effect.
Figure 7 depicts, for each country, the percent GDP gap in 2007 and its decomposition.
It clearly shows that countries experienced the Euro accession heterogeneously.17
We now take a deeper look into the countries which were significantly affected as argued in
Section 3.2. For Ireland, joining the Euro area boosted GDP by 39%. Even though all GDP
components contribute positively to this result, the private consumption and investment
together can explain almost 80% of the total output gain from the treatment.
Table A.6 also shows that the reasons behind the economic slowdown experienced by
some countries at the Euro accession differ from country to country. We find that for France
and Portugal, the private consumption and the net exports accounted for a large share of the
GDP gap. For Germany and Italy, it is the doppelganger difference in private consumption
alongside investment that better explains the negative economic impact of the Euro on GDP.
Before the Euro, the need to exchange local currencies implied extra transaction costs
and exchange rate risk. The single currency was expected to boost cross-border trade and
investment between the member states since doing business in the euro area would be more
cost-efficient and less risky (De Grauwe (2020)). For third parties, the Euro area would be
an attractive place to invest as well. Consumers would benefit from price transparency and
stability. Therefore, it would be expected an increase in investment, exports, and imports
17See Table A.6 for the exact values depicted in Figure 7.
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Figure 7: Doppelganger gaps and GDP components
Notes: The dot depicts, for each country, the percent doppelganger gap of output computed as in
Equation 8. The stacked bars represent the contribution of each GDP component for these gaps.
The values for GDP component sum up the percent doppelganger gap for each treated unit. The
values represent the cumulative effect of the Euro accession since they are computed for 2007, the
last year of the analysis.
but it is not clear in which direction the trade balance would go.
Table A.7 indeed reveals that, with the exception of France and Italy, all countries had
a higher trade volume than if they had not adopted the common currency. This result is
in accordance with Baldwin et al. (2008) and Schmitz and Von Hagen (2011) who argue
that the Euro has significantly promoted trade in the Eurozone countries. Yet, net exports
changed differently across countries. Only Germany and Ireland experienced significant net
trade benefits from the Euro accession. We corroborate the negative impact on net exports
in most cases as documented in Hope (2016).
Moreover, even though the common currency was expected to attract foreign investment
for the whole Euro area, Ireland stands out from the remaining member countries. Invest-
ment in Ireland increased significantly because of the Euro adoption. Therefore, country-
specific characteristics have significantly shaped the impact across member states.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we study the impact of the EMU accession on the macroeconomic perfor-
mance of the first twelve member states. We use the synthetic control method to construct a
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counterfactual of these countries’ GDP. This method allows building a doppelganger which
should represent the economic activity of these countries in the absence of the Euro adoption.
Our findings suggest that there are mild losers (France, Germany, Italy, and Portugal) and
a clear winner (Ireland). Notwithstanding, the drivers of such estimates are heterogeneous
as our GDP decomposition analysis indicates. Our results show that for the majority of
Eurozone countries, Euro spurred government consumption and deterred investment and
private consumption. The common currency also stimulated trade for most cases but only
Germany and Ireland bear positive net trade benefits.
These evidence points out to the importance of analyzing in detail the heterogeneous
responses of GDP components and their implications. For example, given the different
responses of investment and government consumption across member states, it is natural
to ask if the effectiveness of national fiscal policies has changed. This could be especially
interesting given that, with the common currency adoption, countries forgo important policy
instruments.
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A Appendix
A.1 Variables description and source
Table A.1: Variables Description
Variable code Description Source
rgdpna Real gross domestic product at constant 2011 national
prices in million 2011 US dollars normalized to unity in
1970.
PWT 9.1
emp Total employment - number of persons engaged in millions. PWT 9.1
csh prod Labor productivity growth computed by taking the log-
difference between real gdp and total employment
PWT 9.1
pop Total population in millions. PWT 9.1
csh emp Employment share - ratio between total employment and
total population
PWT 9.1
csh c Private consumption expenditure (% of GDP) obtained by
subtracting general government final consumption expen-
diture to the series of final consumption expenditure
World Bank
csh g General government final consumption expenditure (% of
GDP)
World Bank
csh i Gross fixed capital formation (% of GDP) World Bank
csh x Exports of goods and services (% of GDP) World Bank
csh m Imports of goods and services (% of GDP) World Bank
Notes: All variables collected directly from the Penn World Table are from version 9.1 (PWT 9.1)
(Feenstra et al., 2015). All level variables are in real terms and at annual frequency spanning the
year 1970 until 2007. GDP components were collected from the World Bank database in shares of
GDP. The data were collected on the 30-10-2019.
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A.2 Comparison Tables
Table A.2: Predictors’ means (in %) for each country during pre-treatment period
Variable Names Country Doppelganger
Austria
Share of Priv. Consumption 56.27 51.57
Share of Gov. Consumption 17.91 20.58
Share of Investment 26.53 26.27
Share of Imports 32.57 32.35
Share of Exports 31.85 33.93
Employment Share 45.16 48.33
Labor productivity growth 2.47 2.07
Belgium
Share of Priv. Consumption 54.14 54.15
Share of Gov. Consumption 21.41 20.59
Share of Investment 22.87 24.74
Share of Imports 53.80 36.03
Share of Exports 55.39 36.55
Employment Share 38.01 49.41
Labor productivity growth 2.33 1.57
Finland
Share of Priv. Consumption 52.51 52.30
Share of Gov. Consumption 19.38 19.96
Share of Investment 26.66 26.54
Share of Imports 26.57 26.66
Share of Exports 28.02 27.86
Employment Share 47.26 47.22
Labor productivity growth 3.08 1.87
France
Share of Priv. Consumption 55.16 56.10
Share of Gov. Consumption 21.24 19.47
Share of Investment 23.11 23.42
Share of Imports 20.54 21.50
Share of Exports 21.03 22.51
Employment Share 40.49 43.80
Labor productivity growth 2.20 1.23
Germany
Share of Priv. Consumption 57.15 57.29
Share of Gov. Consumption 19.68 18.18
Share of Investment 24.50 24.30
Share of Imports 21.40 21.25
Share of Exports 20.06 21.48
Employment Share 48.36 48.23
Continued on next page...
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... table A.2 continued
Variable Names Country Doppelganger
Labor productivity growth 2.41 1.48
Greece
Share of Priv. Consumption 63.06 60.84
Share of Gov. Consumption 16.75 17.21
Share of Investment 26.46 22.76
Share of Imports 21.77 17.88
Share of Exports 15.50 17.07
Employment Share 38.77 45.51
Labor productivity growth 1.69 1.21
Ireland
Share of Priv. Consumption 61.17 55.50
Share of Gov. Consumption 18.72 24.34
Share of Investment 21.65 24.24
Share of Imports 52.85 34.67
Share of Exports 51.30 30.59
Employment Share 35.36 39.90
Labor productivity growth 3.43 2.14
Italy
Share of Priv. Consumption 59.00 58.72
Share of Gov. Consumption 17.55 17.63
Share of Investment 22.87 23.15
Share of Imports 19.28 19.37
Share of Exports 19.86 19.86
Employment Share 38.25 44.11
Labor productivity growth 2.48 1.24
Luxembourg
Share of Priv. Consumption 48.16 58.05
Share of Gov. Consumption 15.33 10.82
Share of Investment 22.57 29.26
Share of Imports 81.83 39.32
Share of Exports 95.78 41.20
Employment Share 46.63 51.00
Labor productivity growth 1.81 1.54
The Netherlands
Share of Priv. Consumption 50.90 54.78
Share of Gov. Consumption 21.94 18.40
Share of Investment 22.62 26.16
Share of Imports 47.47 37.62
Share of Exports 52.01 38.27
Employment Share 43.78 49.70
Continued on next page...
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... table A.2 continued
Variable Names Country Doppelganger
Labor productivity growth 1.56 1.48
Portugal
Share of Priv. Consumption 66.93 65.45
Share of Gov. Consumption 14.03 13.91
Share of Investment 26.93 21.36
Share of Imports 31.16 21.84
Share of Exports 23.27 21.12
Employment Share 41.81 38.57
Labor productivity growth 2.02 1.29
Spain
Share of Priv. Consumption 63.12 61.46
Share of Gov. Consumption 14.51 14.58
Share of Investment 23.78 23.82
Share of Imports 18.55 17.34
Share of Exports 17.13 17.47
Employment Share 35.38 43.58
Labor productivity growth 2.56 1.10
Notes: Predictors’ means for each country during the pre-treatment period. All numbers are in
percent. Variables definitions can be find in Table A.1.
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A.3 Weights Table
Table A.3: Composition of each doppelganger: country weights (in %)
Donor countries Austria Belgium Finland France Germany Greece Ireland Italy Luxembourg Netherlands Portugal Spain
Australia < 0.1 < 0.1 26.6 < 0.1 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 15.6
Canada < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1
Chile < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 22.0 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1
Denmark < 0.1 46.5 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 26.4 < 0.1 < 0.1
Iceland < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 0.2 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1
Israel < 0.1 13.2 < 0.1 < 0.1 0.9 3.1 50.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 13.5 < 0.1 2.0
Korea < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 14.0 < 0.1 4.0 < 0.1
Mexico < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 29.2 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 22.4 < 0.1 < 0.1 43.0 18.5
New Zealand < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 42.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1
Norway 48.2 7.2 33.9 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 27.9 < 0.1 0.2 13.0 < 0.1 < 0.1
Sweden 33.9 < 0.1 29.0 57.8 31.8 < 0.1 < 0.1 34.9 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1
Switzerland 7.2 33.1 4.2 < 0.1 17.4 < 0.1 < 0.1 5.6 85.8 47.1 5.1 17.6
United Kingdom 10.7 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 4.0 < 0.1 < 0.1 47.9 < 0.1
United States < 0.1 < 0.1 6.2 13.0 49.6 54.8 < 0.1 33.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 46.2
Notes: This table summarizes the weights in percent attributed to each donor country to construct
the synthetic treated units. These weights are used in the baseline analysis.
29
A.4 RMSPE
Table A.4: Relative root mean squared prediction error of the pre- and post- treatment doppelganger gaps.
AUS CAN CHL DNK ISL ISR KOR MEX NZL NOR SWE CHE GBR USA Treated P-Value (ρ)
AUT 2.98 5.00 2.85 4.50 1.73 1.25 2.93 4.35 3.10 7.64 4.41 3.24 1.16 3.97 3.20 0.533
BEL 2.86 4.57 2.85 5.97 3.01 1.79 2.93 4.35 3.28 5.66 4.41 3.24 1.51 5.19 3.40 0.467
FIN 2.61 5.28 2.85 4.42 2.89 1.25 2.93 4.35 3.30 7.65 3.64 3.24 1.33 3.88 1.78 0.867
FRA 2.99 2.49 2.85 4.34 1.61 1.25 2.93 4.35 3.14 7.37 2.47 3.24 1.54 4.04 4.97 0.133
DEU 2.80 4.74 2.85 4.98 2.88 1.25 2.93 4.35 3.30 7.65 4.40 3.24 1.22 2.86 5.98 0.133
GRC 2.81 3.83 2.59 4.83 3.49 2.38 2.74 5.15 3.63 5.93 4.66 3.04 1.33 5.21 0.48 1.000
IRL 2.81 5.34 1.04 4.37 2.00 8.16 2.93 4.35 2.81 8.77 4.40 3.24 1.82 5.19 15.51 0.067
ITA 1.95 3.65 2.85 4.82 1.82 1.25 2.93 3.52 3.16 7.65 4.40 3.24 1.17 5.38 7.88 0.067
LUX 2.70 5.69 2.85 5.90 1.97 1.25 2.93 4.35 2.71 7.35 4.40 3.24 2.43 3.88 3.69 0.467
NLD 2.95 5.74 2.85 7.06 2.56 1.25 2.93 4.35 2.55 7.45 4.41 3.24 1.61 3.87 1.79 0.867
PRT 3.02 5.23 2.85 4.70 3.01 1.27 2.93 3.66 2.88 7.50 4.40 3.24 1.85 3.86 6.26 0.133
ESP 1.95 4.84 2.85 4.81 1.77 1.25 2.93 4.35 3.24 7.65 4.40 3.24 1.77 3.92 1.45 0.933
Notes: The column Treated displays the RMSPE ratio for each country, χ in equation 5. The
column P-Value tell us the chances of obtaining a ratio as high as the treated country if one were
to pick a country at random from the sample including also the treated country, ρ in equation 6.
Given the small number of donor countries, we consider the results significant if there at most 2
countries with a higher RMSPE ratio. For example, for Ireland there is only 1 out of 15 countries
with an RMSPE ratio of at least 15.51 yielding a p-value of 0.067.
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A.5 In-time placebo test
Figure A.1: In-time placebo test - 1995
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Notes: In each graph, the blue dashed line represents the normalized real GDP for the synthetic
country and the black full line represents the series for the actual country. The shaded area
corresponds to two standard deviations of the difference between the treated country and the
doppelganger prior to the Euro accession. The vertical line depicts the placebo treatment period -
1995 for all countries. For all countries the analysis starts in 1970 and ends in 2007.
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Figure A.2: In-time placebo test - 1998
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Notes: In each graph, the blue dashed line represents the normalized real GDP for the synthetic
country and the black full line represents the series for the actual country. The shaded area
corresponds to two standard deviations of the difference between the treated country and the
doppelganger prior to the Euro accession. The vertical line depicts the placebo treatment period -
1998 for all countries. For all countries the analysis starts in 1970 and ends in 2007.
A.6 Changing donor pool
In each of the following set of graphs, the blue dashed line represents the normalized real
GDP for the synthetic country and the black full line represents the series for the actual
country. The vertical line depicts the treatment period. For all countries the analysis starts
in 1970 and ends in 2007. We iteratively exclude different countries from the donor pool as
argued in Section 3.3.1.
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Figure A.3: SCM without Australia
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Notes: In each graph, the blue dashed line represents the normalized real GDP for the synthetic
country and the black full line represents the series for the actual country. The shaded area
corresponds to two standard deviations of the difference between the treated country and the
doppelganger prior to the Euro accession. The vertical line depicts the placebo treatment period -
2001 for Greece and 1999 for all other countries. For all countries the analysis starts in 1970 and
ends in 2007. Australia is excluded from the donor pool.
Figure A.4: SCM without Israel
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Notes: In each graph, the blue dashed line represents the normalized real GDP for the synthetic
country and the black full line represents the series for the actual country. The shaded area
corresponds to two standard deviations of the difference between the treated country and the
doppelganger prior to the Euro accession. The vertical line depicts the placebo treatment period -
2001 for Greece and 1999 for all other countries. For all countries the analysis starts in 1970 and
ends in 2007. Israel is excluded from the donor pool.
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Figure A.5: SCM without Mexico
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Notes: In each graph, the blue dashed line represents the normalized real GDP for the synthetic
country and the black full line represents the series for the actual country. The shaded area
corresponds to two standard deviations of the difference between the treated country and the
doppelganger prior to the Euro accession. The vertical line depicts the placebo treatment period -
2001 for Greece and 1999 for all other countries. For all countries the analysis starts in 1970 and
ends in 2007. Mexico is excluded from the donor pool.
Figure A.6: SCM without Norway
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Notes: In each graph, the blue dashed line represents the normalized real GDP for the synthetic
country and the black full line represents the series for the actual country. The shaded area
corresponds to two standard deviations of the difference between the treated country and the
doppelganger prior to the Euro accession. The vertical line depicts the placebo treatment period -
2001 for Greece and 1999 for all other countries. For all countries the analysis starts in 1970 and
ends in 2007. Norway is excluded from the donor pool.
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Figure A.7: SCM without Switzerland
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Notes: In each graph, the blue dashed line represents the normalized real GDP for the synthetic
country and the black full line represents the series for the actual country. The shaded area
corresponds to two standard deviations of the difference between the treated country and the
doppelganger prior to the Euro accession. The vertical line depicts the placebo treatment period -
2001 for Greece and 1999 for all other countries. For all countries the analysis starts in 1970 and
ends in 2007. Switzerland is excluded from the donor pool.
Figure A.8: SCM without the United States
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Notes: In each graph, the blue dashed line represents the normalized real GDP for the synthetic
country and the black full line represents the series for the actual country. The shaded area
corresponds to two standard deviations of the difference between the treated country and the
doppelganger prior to the Euro accession. The vertical line depicts the placebo treatment period -
2001 for Greece and 1999 for all other countries. For all countries the analysis starts in 1970 and
ends in 2007. The United States is excluded from the donor pool.
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Table A.5: Composition of each doppelganger: country weights (in %)
Donor countries Austria Belgium Finland France Germany Greece Ireland Italy Luxembourg Netherlands Portugal Spain
Australia 18.1 < 0.1 39.6 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 0.1
Canada < 0.1 < 0.1 22.6 52.0 18.3 < 0.1 < 0.1 32.4 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1
Chile < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 22.0 < 0.1 5.2 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1
Iceland < 0.1 < 0.1 17.2 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1
Israel 16.4 24.6 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 50.1 < 0.1 52.3 12.0 15.1 4.0
Korea < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 1.9 < 0.1
Mexico 1.8 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 39.8 17.5
New Zealand 18.6 < 0.1 < 0.1 32.9 10.4 30.8 < 0.1 4.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1
Norway 13.3 < 0.1 < 0.1 15.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 27.9 < 0.1 < 0.1 22.6 < 0.1 < 0.1
Switzerland 31.8 75.4 20.6 < 0.1 35.6 2.6 < 0.1 12.2 42.5 65.4 26.7 21.3
United States < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 35.7 66.6 < 0.1 51.3 < 0.1 < 0.1 16.6 57.1
Notes: This table summarizes the weights in percent attributed to each donor country to construct
the synthetic treated units. Relative to the baseline analysis, the donor pool now excludes Denmark,
Sweden and the United Kingdom.
A.7 Components analysis
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Figure A.9: Components of Austria’s GDP
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Notes: The plots depict, for each GDP component, the deviation in percent from the value of 1970.
The blue dashed lines represents the synthetic Austria computed in section 2. The full black lines
stand for the actual Austrian series. The shaded area corresponds to two standard deviations of
the difference between the treated country and the doppelganger prior to the Euro accession.
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Figure A.10: Components of Belgium’s GDP
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Notes: The plots depict, for each GDP component, the deviation in percent from the value of 1970.
The blue dashed lines represents the synthetic Austria computed in section 2. The full black lines
stand for the actual Belgian series. The shaded area corresponds to two standard deviations of the
difference between the treated country and the doppelganger prior to the Euro accession.
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Figure A.11: Components of Finland’s GDP
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(f) Net Exports
Notes: The plots depict, for each GDP component, the deviation in percent from the value of 1970.
The blue dashed lines represents the synthetic Belgium computed in section 2. The full black lines
stand for the actual Finnish series. The shaded area corresponds to two standard deviations of the
difference between the treated country and the doppelganger prior to the Euro accession.
39
Figure A.12: Components of France’s GDP
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(f) Net Exports
Notes: The plots depict, for each GDP component, the deviation in percent from the value of 1970.
The blue dashed lines represents the synthetic France computed in section 2. The full black lines
stand for the actual French series. The shaded area corresponds to two standard deviations of the
difference between the treated country and the doppelganger prior to the Euro accession.
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Figure A.13: Components of Germany’s GDP
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(f) Net Exports
Notes: The plots depict, for each GDP component, the deviation in percent from the value of 1970.
The blue dashed lines represents the synthetic Germany computed in section 2. The full black lines
stand for the actual German series. The shaded area corresponds to two standard deviations of the
difference between the treated country and the doppelganger prior to the Euro accession.
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Figure A.14: Components of Greece’s GDP
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(f) Net Exports
Notes: The plots depict, for each GDP component, the deviation in percent from the value of 1970.
The blue dashed lines represents the synthetic Greece computed in section 2. The full black lines
stand for the actual Greek series. The shaded area corresponds to two standard deviations of the
difference between the treated country and the doppelganger prior to the Euro accession.
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Figure A.15: Components of Ireland’s GDP
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(f) Net Exports
Notes: The plots depict, for each GDP component, the deviation in percent from the value of 1970.
The blue dashed lines represents the synthetic Ireland computed in section 2. The full black lines
stand for the actual Irish series. The shaded area corresponds to two standard deviations of the
difference between the treated country and the doppelganger prior to the Euro accession.
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Figure A.16: Components of Italy’s GDP
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(f) Net Exports
Notes: The plots depict, for each GDP component, the deviation in percent from the value of 1970.
The blue dashed lines represents the synthetic Italy computed in section 2. The full black lines
stand for the actual Italian series. The shaded area corresponds to two standard deviations of the
difference between the treated country and the doppelganger prior to the Euro accession.
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Figure A.17: Components of Luxembourg’s GDP
−
10
0
10
0
30
0
50
0
70
0
90
0
1970 1976 1982 1988 1994 2000 2006
 
(a) Private Consumption
−
10
0
10
0
30
0
50
0
70
0
90
0
1970 1976 1982 1988 1994 2000 2006
 
(b) Government Consumption
−
10
0
10
0
30
0
50
0
70
0
90
0
1970 1976 1982 1988 1994 2000 2006
 
(c) Investment
−
10
0
10
0
30
0
50
0
70
0
90
0
1970 1976 1982 1988 1994 2000 2006
 
(d) Exports
−
10
0
10
0
30
0
50
0
70
0
90
0
1970 1976 1982 1988 1994 2000 2006
 
(e) Imports
−
10
0
10
0
30
0
50
0
70
0
90
0
1970 1976 1982 1988 1994 2000 2006
 
(f) Net Exports
Notes: The plots depict, for each GDP component, the deviation in percent from the value of
1970. The blue dashed lines represents the synthetic Luxembourg computed in section 2. The full
black lines stand for the actual Luxembourg’s series. The shaded area corresponds to two standard
deviations of the difference between the treated country and the doppelganger prior to the Euro
accession. 45
Figure A.18: Components of The Netherlands’s GDP
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(f) Net Exports
Notes: The plots depict, for each GDP component, the deviation in percent from the value of 1970.
The blue dashed lines represents the synthetic Netherlands computed in section 2. The full black
lines stand for the actual Dutch series. The shaded area corresponds to two standard deviations of
the difference between the treated country and the doppelganger prior to the Euro accession.
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Figure A.19: Components of Portugal’s GDP
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(f) Net Exports
Notes: The plots depict, for each GDP component, the deviation in percent from the value of 1970.
The blue dashed lines represents the synthetic Portugal computed in section 2. The full black lines
stand for the actual Portuguese series. The shaded area corresponds to two standard deviations of
the difference between the treated country and the doppelganger prior to the Euro accession.
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Figure A.20: Components of Spain’s GDP
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(f) Net Exports
Notes: The plots depict, for each GDP component, the deviation in percent from the value of 1970.
The blue dashed lines represents the synthetic Spain computed in section 2. The full black lines
stand for the actual Spanish series. The shaded area corresponds to two standard deviations of the
difference between the treated country and the doppelganger prior to the Euro accession.
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A.8 What explains the doppelganger gap?
Table A.6: What explains the cumulative doppelganger gap?
Private Government
Investment
Net
Doppelganger Gap
Consumption Consumption Exports
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%) Euro per capita
Austria 3.77 -2.48 -1.73 -4.96 -5.40 -1,712
Belgium -3.35 1.08 -1.39 -2.02 -5.68 -1,668
Finland 1.69 1.93 0.06 -0.97 2.72 777
France -5.02 1.31 -2.40 -2.86 -8.97 -2,632
Germany -12.18 -2.34 -6.43 4.70 -16.25 -5,788
Greece -0.83 2.83 1.87 -8.94 -5.07 -1,098
Ireland 11.36 4.31 18.51 4.90 39.09 10,781
Italy -10.31 -1.79 -5.33 -0.93 -18.36 -6,089
Luxembourg -16.84 5.92 -4.37 27.86 12.57 4,697
Netherlands -4.28 6.05 -0.27 -0.98 0.52 168
Portugal -7.46 2.07 -0.92 -5.86 -12.17 -2,558
Spain -2.99 4.35 7.65 -5.11 3.90 900
Notes: This table summarizes the cumulative doppelganger gaps for each Euro member country and
presents the channels driving the impact of the accession by decomposing GDP into its components.
The doppelganger gap represents the percentage GDP gain or loss in 2007 from adopting the
common currency, i.e. for country c we define percent doppelganger gap2007,c = (GDP2007,c −
GDP dop2007,c)/GDP
dop
2007,c. Then, the table shows the contribution of each GDP component for the
GDP gain or loss. Values are constructed in a way to sum up to the doppelganger gap. The
decomposition of net exports into exports and imports is presented in Table A.7.
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Table A.7: Net exports decomposition
Net Exports Exports Imports
Austria -4.96 5.56 10.52
Belgium -2.02 21.17 23.19
Finland -0.97 7.91 8.88
France -2.86 -11.70 -8.84
Germany 4.70 4.50 -0.20
Greece -8.94 1.62 10.56
Ireland 4.90 69.94 65.04
Italy -0.93 -8.74 -7.81
Luxembourg 27.86 147.85 119.99
Netherlands -0.98 15.38 16.35
Portugal -5.86 -1.37 4.49
Spain -5.11 1.84 6.95
Notes: This table presents the summary of the net exports decomposition into exports and imports
for each treated country. It tells how much the net exports contributed to the doppelganger output
gap in percent.
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